The Apparition of the Perceived Enemy: National Identity and Peace Building in South Sudan

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Abstract: Between July 8th and 11th, 2016 an intense fighting erupted in South Sudan. This was the second instance to the previous fighting that broke-out between December 15th and 18th, 2013 and both happened in Juba the capital city of the country. These revealed that, South Sudan was not only the newest nation in the world, but also but also the youngest nation facing many dilemmas in forging for national identity and consolidating peace. These incidences require scholars to be sober and surpass the oversimplifications of the causes of this mayhem. Thus, understanding these challenges calls for re-considering and re-framing the understanding of the real enemy, to forge a healthy national identity that the country needs. In this journey, I challenge South Sudanese to re-think reflectively and critically if they are to understand the manifestation of the postcolonial–neo-colonial image of imperialism that have not allowed meaningful transition and state building and unlearn the perceived misunderstanding, and invitation is for them to embrace roles of democracy, nationhood, and governance in peace and nation building. As this paper advances, it is by embracing such reconsiderations that nation building, and the identity formation among South Sudanese, the prospects newly country of South Sudan will be possible.

Keywords: Conflicts, democracy, governance; national identity, peace; and South Sudan

Introduction
Three days before the commemoration and celebration of the fifth anniversary of their Independence Day, South Sudanese were plunged into intense fighting that lasted for three days, from 8 to 11 of July, 2016. Different from the December 2013 fierce civil violence incident, the first after the independence of South Sudan; this time civilians were killed in front of United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) forces, who were charged by the UN with the ‘responsibility to protect’ civilians (Mamdani, 2017a). December 2013 fighting erupted following collapse of the new government signifed by the dismissal of the Vice-President and other high-ranking officials; the July 2016 fighting that erupted on his return to Juba with more than 1,200 armed fighters which was perceived as an essential starting point for the implementation of the peace agreement.
This return and its aftermath in particular was a challenge to the African Union’s efforts for the implementation of African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan (AUCISS) report recommendations and the concluded peace deal between the two major warring parties in 2015. It testified to the validity of one of the commonly held political positions that “Dinka without Kiir will not settle; Nuer without Machar will not settle; and yet, the two will not work together” (Mamdani, 2014: 53). In a way, the “ongoing conflict is a manifestation of several aspects of the poor implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), as well as historical power and resource conflicts between the Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups and the weakness of mechanistic approaches to peace” (Masabo, 2014). In addition, it echoes Masabo (2013: 149) observation, that “separation without addressing the root causes of the conflicts is not panacea to ensuring sustainable peace” in South Sudan.

In this article, I invite South Sudanese to re-consider more processes that are inclusive, which are mindful of the fact that, there are multiple sources of authority and thus constant and dynamic competition and struggles for recognition (Lund, 2016). This is key for a better new South Sudan since, and as other scholars have remarked, “the situation in South Sudan is not just another African war”. This is a test of a new state and nation-building concepts. Mediation and peace building that undermine the work done to date will simply cement the crisis” (Le Riche, 2014a). This is so because “this crisis is beyond anything we have seen in scale, magnitude and depth. A quick fix power-sharing agreement will not work – problems of the country and leadership are too deep. [She repeated, for emphasis], ‘we need to re-boot South Sudan – no quick fix, no deal, will do it’” (Mamdani, 2014: 53).

The latter emphasis was similar to Le Riche’s (2014a) observation as well as to what Mamdani observed in his 2016 lecture, ‘South Sudan: The Road to Civil War’, that “It’s unfair to call South Sudan a failed state, because the political foundation for the existence of a state has yet to be forged in South Sudan” (Hawkins, 2016). Thus, “it needs a second transition, this time under an authority other than the United States, Britain and Norway, whose project has failed, or IGAD, whose members have conflicting interests in South Sudan” (Mamdani, 2017a: 11). As such, one can argue that the separation of Sudan into Republic of Sudan and Republic of South Sudan in July 2011, following the secession referendum and ultimate independence for southerners opened a new chapter in the South Sudan that goes beyond the perceived problem (Masabo, 2013). It partly calls South Sudanese to re-address and rethink anew if their hard-won independence is to reflect what they long fought for particularly the access to resources and recognition.
This article revolves around the imperative for appreciating diversities as a basis for forging a better future in South Sudan. I tease South Sudanese understanding of how capitalist mechanisms have been manifesting themselves in the postcolonial or the neo-colonial in Africa. In addition, I pursued them to unlearn the perceived misunderstanding of the problems by gauging how to transform themselves from a long history of warring as survival mechanisms to embrace democracy, new nationhood, and governance as alternatives of wars, guns, bullets in the course of statecraft.

In that regard, in this article, I concentrates on the conflicting dynamics of South Sudan since 2011 and more particularly the December 2013 civil plight and developments after December 2013 fighting. I focus on African Union’s initiatives in response to the South Sudan crisis. I pay particular with attention decisions reached by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), during its 411th meeting held at the level of Heads of State and Government, in Banjul, The Gambia, on 30 December 2013, which mandated the establishment of the Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan (AUCISS).

One of these developments is the collapse of the peace deal between President Kiir and his vice President Machar that reinstated him and called for his and assuming his executive duties which were revoked from him in April 2013. These, will serve as the conceptual foundation in explaining peace dilemmas and national building trajectories in South Sudan, which is frequently experiencing a series of civil revolts that has been going on in the country since its founding day. In this particle also, I discuss the dilemma of secession and missed opportunities on the one hand, and challenges and prospects for peace consolidation in the South Sudan on the other. It is my hope that, by discussing missed peace opportunities, and proposing a way forward; I will contributing to this noble endeavour for peace in South Sudan.

After this introduction, I structure the rest of the article as follows: the second part provides an account on how scholars have approached South Sudanese peace, and how this article approaches it immediately follows. Within this part, I present various scholarly views of South Sudan peace, and thereafter the theoretical lens that this article employs for understanding the conflicts and peace building in processes. The third part addresses the dilemmas and missed opportunities. Fourth part that is devoted to discussing challenges as well as the prospects for peace consolidation in South Sudan follows and finally the conclusion.
Approaching the South Sudan Peace Processes

South Sudan and the challenge of change

Founding of South Sudan almost fifty years after the African phase of decolonization, has not made it a unique case. Just like many other African countries, it has not managed to avoid what characterizes most of African countries: the imported state, or state formation preceding nation creation. Banking on Ndlovu-Gatshen (2013: 24), what is going on in South Sudan like many other postcolonial African states reveals the “negative manifestation of sovereignty normally ascribed by other states rather than positive sovereignty rooted inside and manifested in effective control and popular acceptability.” Thus, if the state has preceded the nation then, the South Sudanese do not only need to overcome this inherent African phenomenon; but also, to build a nation out of fifty years of war, as well as address the common façade of the inherited state.

For a number of scholars (e.g. AUCISS, 2014; Johnson, 2014; Le Riche, 2014a; Mamdani 2017a; Masabo, 2014; 2013), what is happening in South Sudan reveals the internal weaknesses of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). That is to say, by excluding political, civil and women groups, and strengthening the armed dictators in the north and introducing one in the South, the 2005 CPA saw the seeds of retardation are inhibiting progress in South Sudan (Mamdani, 2017a). It set a bad beginning with a militaristic assumption that; only those who waged war should determine the terms of the peace. The talks excluded political and civic groups, strengthening the armed dictatorship in the North, and introducing one in the South (Mamdani, 2017a: 11). In this way, I argue (2014), South Sudanese are confronted to mirror the extent to which the their peace processes have been so rationalised that, the emotional and affective part of it sometimes gets drowned in rational and idealistic concepts, good only for the classroom and often inefficient in the field. Moreover, they need to understand that warriors alone will not bring them long-lasting peace, and that any future peace talks need to consider the proper involvement of the various groups of people and various approaches such as feminist approaches, have to peace. As experience has taught us, “while most men come to the negotiating table directly from the war room and battlefield, women usually arrive straight from civil activism” (Masabo, 2014). As such, it is vital to recognise that, in South Sudan, “the very political and institutional foundation for the existence of a state—as a political process that legitimates a sovereign power, and the creation of an administrative, technical and legal infrastructure as the means for exercising that power — has yet to be forged” (Mamdani, 2017a: 11).
Studies on South Sudan peace process: a synopsis

Several scholars have written on South Sudan conflicts, and suggested solutions to solve the problems of peace building. From their analysis, there are two groups or types of factors suggesting causes for conflicts. The first group of factors is from the theorists and scholars, who assert that, the problem of South Sudan has gone far beyond local boundaries, and that its solution needs national and international efforts. These are scholars like Copnall (2014) and Johnson (2011). This study supports this assertion, and agrees that, of course, when one talks about the conflicts of Dinka and Nuer in the context of South Sudan, which goes further to include disputes on the nature of CPA, international solution are indispensable. However, when one thinks about the relationship between the two ethnic groups, referring to things shared in common in our case political power and access to resources, here the traditional approaches are more appropriate to international and mechanistic approaches (Masabo, 2014).

The second group of factors is from theorists and scholars, who contend that, there are traditional measures based on people’s culture that are still useful to solve the contemporary conflicts. Within this are by scholars like Sansculotte-Greenidge and Tsuma (2011), Sansculotte-Greenidge (2011), Hagg & Kagwanja (2007), and Osman (2007). In the same line of thinking, this study supports the need to apply traditional cultural approaches.

However, in differentiating itself from the existing line of scholarship, the study calls for reconsidering democracy, citizenship, and governance as key areas within which South Sudan can overcome the challenges it is facing. Given this scenario, one can suggest then, that, the end of the conflict between Republic of Sudan and Republic of South Sudan has nothing to do with conflict between these two tribes. As many have argued, the conflicts between Dinka and Nuer are older than the former, and factors or sources of conflict apparently differ. Competition for resources is necessary for livelihood for the two tribes, but unfortunately, this is not the case for the two nations (Republics of Sudan and South Sudan). Therefore, specific solutions for Dinka-Nuer have to come mainly from within the two ethnic groups, and less from outside. Furthermore, other issues such as the military-civilian based conflict, state-people (ordinary citizens) based conflicts ought to have the right path to their address. Nevertheless, when it comes to other ethnic groups in South Sudan, like Shuiulk, Equatorian similar logic follows soot that: solving of conflicts among ethnic groups is the first as it is the basis for enhancing national cohesion.

Cementing on the relevance of culture to maintain peace, Mckay (2009: 235) asserts that, since 1956 for instance, there have been several civil wars between tribes allied with northern Sudan and those allied with South
Sudan. Although the Dinka tribe’s men maintained influence for the 50 years’ war against the former North Sudan, the role of Nuer was also significant in the struggle against North. To overcome this, Hagg & Kagwanja (2007: 25), call for the acknowledgment of the role of regional peace and security mechanisms in conflict resolution, as well as the use of traditional justice mechanism in conflict resolution, especially in the context of increasing state failure on the continent. They further caution against the enthusiastic embrace of international justice mechanisms that may sometimes create obstacles to peace and reconciliation.

Additionally, they stress that, since ‘war begins in the mind’; peace too ought to begin from the mind. This entails conflict transformation that seeks to broaden perceptions and social relations, by creating historical awareness, and destroying myths upon which adversary identities rests. Understanding culture and cultural diversity is an important key to unlocking and understanding complex human nature. Many earlier and more recent expeditions and studies point to the existence of a rich oral culture, and resilience and creativity amongst the people. However, as colonialism took root in the country as in most countries on continent, one of the earliest casualties was this noble institution; culture (see Osman, 2007: 125), Dinka and Nuer’s culture being amongst the casualties. But as Jinadu (2000: 3) attests, their culture must be viewed from the more positive and more embracing perspective of creating and enabling an environment for self-realization and for the enjoyment and sustenance of self-development.

**Theoretical framework**

In the course of understanding the nature and dynamics of conflicts, theorists have developed several theories that capture some or most of the major preoccupations of the phenomena. This study utilizes the theoretical formulation of Morton Deutsch, Peter T. Coleman and Eric C. Marcus—the Cooperative Theory as refined in 2006.

Cooperative theory has two basic ideas: one relates to the type of interdependence among goals of the people involved in a given situation; and the other pertains to the type of action taken by the people involved. In addition to that, the theory postulates two basic types of interdependence goal correlations, positive and negative interdependence. Positive interdependence correlation occurs when goals are linked in such a way that the amount or probability of a person’s goal attainment is positively correlated with the amount or probability of another obtaining his/her goals. However, in negative interdependence correlation the goals are linked in such a way that the probability of goal attainment is negatively correlated with the amount of probability of the other’s goal attainment. As Deutsch et al. (2006: 24) simply puts it; “if you are positively linked with another, then you sink or swim together and with negative linkage, if other
sinks you swim and if the other swims you sink.” Thus, positive interdependence can result from people linking to one another, and rewarded in terms of their joint achievements. Similarly, with regard to negative interdependence, it can result from people delinking from one another or from their being rewarded in such a way that the more other gets of the reward, the less another gets, and so on. In addition to positive and negative interdependence, it is as well necessary to recognize that, there can be a lack of interdependence or independence, such that the activities and fate of the people involved do not affect one another directly or indirectly. If they are completely independent of one another, no conflict arises; the existence of a conflict implies some form of interdependence (Deutsch et al., 2006: 25). Further to that, Deutsch et al., (2006) also highlights two basic types of action by an individual: ‘effective actions’, which improve the actors’ chances of obtaining a goal and ‘bungling actions’, which worsen the actors’ chance of obtaining the goal.

Using the above theoretical framework, then the conflicts between Dinka and Nuer have a positive interdependence. The history shows that, over time, these two tribes have been able to share their struggles, and, in fact, their goal was to swim together. Positive interdependence is clear, which informs that, effective action can easily work. In addition, both Dinka and Nuer share the country, but with slight difference shares of political positions. That is to say, although South Sudan President Kiir is Dinka, Machar a Nuer has been a leading figure of this second major ethnic group in the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLM/A) politics for years. Therefore, it is in this context that, I advocate for amicable and horizontal conflict resolution mechanisms which will embracing modernity without discarding the culture of co-existence, addressing the quest for national building, and forging true national identity needed in this newly country as the one of the most valid and reliable approaches to solving the conflicts South Sudan.

Along with the Cooperative theory, the study adopts the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) (2013), ‘Pillars of Peace Framework’ as an auxiliary theoretical lens to help in understanding the process of peace consolidation in South Sudan. This framework identifies the national characteristics, which are most closely associated with peace, and have been derived from a process of statistical analysis (IEP, 2013: 1). Pillars of peace framework approaches peace by emphasising on the need for understanding and describing the factors that create peaceful societies. In that regard, pillars of peace framework is best suited to understanding the dynamics and challenges facing the peace consolidation in South Sudan.
Dilemma of secession and missed opportunities

December 2013 and July 2016 contain two sad events in the country’s memory, such that South Sudanese are challenged to reflect upon as they forge ahead and they proceed to their forthcoming anniversaries of statehood. They signified that, the road to statehood and national building in South Sudan was premised on the wrong assumption. Assured of unconditional international support, South Sudan’s rulers acted with impunity, while strategies to establish healthy future for all South Sudanese were not entertained. More seriously, the resolutions to create an all-party transitional government of national unity, to hold a constitutional conference and an election within two years were ignored after independence in 2011. Moreover, as many scholars have argued, it seems that there is no consensus on how to move forward (see Mamdani, 2017a: 8).

It is probably because of this, that one of the terms of reference given to the AUCISS the AUPSC, Communiqué PSC/AHG/COMM.1 (CDXI) dated December 31 2013 directly instructed the commissioners “to investigate the causes underlying the violations” (AUCISS, 2014: 8). According to Mamdani’s (2014) AUCISS separate opinion (report), the explanation to such term of reference is that, the underlying causes for ongoing violation in South Sudan is a “conundrum” of appariition of the perceived enemy. Taking it further Mamdani, (2017a: 11), argue that, the troika (the United States, Britain, and Norway also often known as Friends of IGAD [Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, the regional bloc]) were convinced that the main threat to peace after independence would come from the north, the troika pushed for a hasty transition, bypassing democratic reform. Here under are two examples of the dilemma and missed opportunities.

Dilemma of secession

Secession in the CPA was a last resort if the possibility of the new Sudan was impossible. However, it became the only issue, that, both the South Sudanese, IGAD and the troika—Friends of IGAD were interested in. “The demise of the enthusiasm to Sudan reform agenda: struggling for the ‘New Sudan’” (Masabo, 2013: 147) as primary agenda to CPA, opened an era of strong emphasis on secession as the only solution to the prevailing problem. As Iyekolo (2011: 54-56) puts it, “events in the post-Garang era saw the re-awakening of self-determination clause that was meant to be a last resort should unity be impossible to attain. [In its aftermath] ... the quest for independence then became the main vision and driving force of SPLM/A commitment to the CPA implementation under a façade of sometimes ‘untenable excuses’ as well as tacit and indifferent posture with a final aim of secession in view.” Thus instead of reforming Sudan; separation was preferred and other critical issues such as of contested or the three
transitional areas (TTA): Abyei, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile were ignored or less attended to (Masabo, 2013). In that regard, the declaration of the independence of the Republic of South Sudanese manifested that: “The CPA’s national reform agenda has been largely ignored, although this was the very underlying comprehensive claim of the CPA” (Institute of Security Studies (ISS) 2009: 10).

Thus, with the secession, basic challenges of peace building became evident, as the often-framed archenemy framed Khartoum perceived for quite long as almost the only problem, could no more provide the benchmark for unity. The opening of internal realities that followed the secession revealed how South Sudanese misperceived the problems of their nation. It became apparent that the challenge for peace building in South Sudan lied within the perception formed by South Sudanese who framed their country’s problems (Sudan before separation of South Sudan) and embraced images of the North (present Republic of Sudan) as the only enemy. This led to the limited nationalist struggles, which took struggle for self-determination to mean secession. They seemed to have not realised that the major challenges were the crisis of the colonial legacy, particularly recognition (citizenship) and access to property.

As the result, how to approach national building and identity formation amongst South Sudanese which was key to the prospects of the new country—the Republic of South Sudan escaped their imagination. Because of that, governance rooted in the country’s multiple diversities that could have been the only guarantee for South Sudan’s unity and viability could not take root. However, when addressing the challenges and consequences of southern Sudan’s secession, it is important to focus on the future rather than on the past (Nyaba, 2014: x). In that respect, if South Sudanese is to reap from its fifty years efforts, it has to devise a means to overcome the triple challenges. This may be by embracing modernity without discarding the culture of co-existence; addressing the quest for national building by putting in place structures work governance systems; and forging of appropriate true and needed South Sudanese identity by politics of inclusion and co-existence.

Ongoing South Sudan fighting: civil war or ethnic cleansing?
The collapse of government of South Sudan in 2013 following Kiir’s dismissal of the cabinet members, beginning with the vice President Riek Machar, has been explained different by different scholars (De Vries and Schomerus, 2017; Gosztonyi, 2016; Krause, 2019; Nyadera, 2018; Owiso, 2018). However, many may agree with Johnson’s (2014: 300) analysis that “despite the fact that the arrested ministers came from a variety of communities across South Sudan, Western media reports cast the political
struggle exclusively in tribal terms, of Salva Kiir’s Dinka against Riek Machar’s Nuer. The targeted killings in Juba and revenge killings ... in Akobo and Bor in Jonglei state seemed to bear this out.” Put differently and capturing Mamdani (2016) ‘Who’s to Blame in South Sudan’ piece appearing in the Boston review, Hawkins (2016) argue that:

…the outbreak of violence in South Sudan in 2013 was accompanied by various political motivations. One, identified by Mamdani, was the motivation of the South Sudanese political leadership to separate society into “us vs. them.” This strategy, he argued, turned the crisis from political to ethnic. While it had been common for neighboring tribes to fight over resources in the past, these tensions were exacerbated by external influences that emphasized tribalism over common culture (Hawkins, 2016).

With this note, making sense of the situation unfolding in South Sudan is a daunting task since “most commentary on the situation mirrors most of which has come before regarding conflict in Africa more generally” (Le Riche, 2014a). Nevertheless, as Johnson (2014) and Mamdani (2016) observe, the collapse of national building project is transforming it from political violence into a civil war and ethnic conflict between the Dinka and Nuer. This was a proof that unique “context was largely overlooked during South Sudan’s crucial interim period and after independence” (Mamdani, 2014: 54).

**Missed peace opportunities**

Peace is one of the major opportunities missed by South Sudanese people. Peace if viewed through the lens of both negative and positive peace (Galtung, 1964; Galtung and Fischer, 2013). Negative peace which is the absence of violence, or fear of violence (used as the definition of peace to create the Global Peace Index [GPI]); while positive peace may be defined as the attitudes, institutions and structures that, when strengthened, lead to a more peaceful society (IEP, 2013: 1). It is in the latter sense that ought to be in South Sudan’s case and which is likely to be attained by employing the ‘Pillars of peace framework’. The utility of this framework emanates from the general trend in peace and conflict scholarship, which has revealed limited research investigating the underlying causes of peace. Many studies have focused on understanding, factors which are commonly associated with conflicts. As such

[Pillars of peace framework] …provides a framework for assessing the positive peace factors that create peaceful societies. The taxonomy also forms an ideal base for measuring a society’s potential for peace. This is an eight-
part taxonomy consists of: a well-functioning government; a sound business environment; an equitable distribution of resources; an acceptance of the rights of others; good relations with neighbours; free flow of information; a high level of human capital; and low levels of corruption. These eight pillars were found to be associated with peaceful environments and are both inter-dependent and mutually reinforcing, such that improvements in one factor would tend to strengthen others and vice versa. Therefore, the relative strength of any one Pillar has the potential to positively or negatively influence the others, thereby influencing peace (IEP, 2013: 1-2).

It is true that, if put within this framework or if South Sudan could have embraced such an approach; continued internal crises could have given way to peace and to the ultimate goals of peace building and national development. However, this seems to have not been the case. To forge ahead in the search for peace, the first proposal is for the government of South Sudan and its people to work towards a consensus, and not a compromise and see how they can re-work, and repair their road map towards better peaceful co-existence. Secondly is that “the ruling political elite in South Sudan must change their modus operandi if South Sudan is not to slide back into conflicts and anarchy” (Nyaba 2014: x). The eight pillars of the proposed approach can as well summarize what was missing within the thinking of many South Sudanese military-political elites who have thought to address their misunderstanding wrongly-by the use of guns! While many can rebuke the so-called rebels; the fact remains that, the work done in the South Sudan by the incumbent, has to large extent stimulated what has happened. Since this is not the subject intended to be addressed in this article; the next parts concentrate on analyzing the triple challenges to South Sudan peace and link them to Pillars of Peace Framework as the solution where possible.

**Challenges and prospects for peace consolidation in South Sudan**

Some of the terms of reference given to the AUCISS commissioners on their appointment to the commission, were “to make recommendations on the best ways, and means to ensure accountability, reconciliation and healing among all South Sudanese communities with a view to deterring and preventing the occurrence of the violations in future, and to make recommendations on how to move the country forward in terms of unity, cooperation, and sustainable development” (AUCISS, 2014: 8). In fulfilling these tasks associated with these terms however, an observation was supposed to be made, that, “South Sudan is not a failed state but a failed transition. It needs a second transition, this time under an authority other
than the former one whose approach was of one-size-fits-all (Mamdani, 2017a: 11).

Moreover, though the July 2016 fights erupted while implementing the peace deal between Machar and Kiir South Sudanese should not despair. Instead, we have to work to help South Sudan to overcome its statecraft challenges. As observed by Johnson (2014: 309), “there is potential for opening up space for other voices to be heard and other groups to be involved in resolving the underlying issues that led to conflict.” In responding to this observation and contributing towards Sudan’s second transition, I propose hereunder three issues or areas to be considered by South Sudanese as they forge ahead to make their country reflect what they fought for.

**Embracing modernity: human rights and democracy in South Sudan**

Eruption of intense fighting in December 2013 and July 2016 in Juba, in a period of five years after its independence was one of the signs that roots for respect of human rights and promotion of democracy and democratic leadership have not taken roots in South Sudan. It was an indication that, unless people are listened to, involved, included, their rights respected, and protected; Africa will never graduate from violence. That is to say, as a continent, Africa seems to be de-democratising.

Instead of popular empowerment, participation, competition, and legitimacy, the democratisation process in South Sudan seems to result into feelings of dispossession and growing alienation amongst the people. To South Sudanese leadership in particular, these wars were signs of of immaturity to both sides: the incumbent and the sucked vice president because of three reasons. One, they failed to learn from history that, on the one hand, it was because of the perceived oppressions of the North, which forced the southerners to take up arms and launch the liberation movement for self-determination. As such, they quickly forget that even with fifty years of war, South Sudan’s independence finally came through peaceful negotiation envisaged by the CPA. Two, it seems that they have not Secondly, they did not understood what made them to experience internal differences soon after secession which were formally were absorbed by their perceived enemy. In addition, they seem not to acknowledge that the challenge of competing or struggles for recognition and access to resources could not be avoided, but only lived-with and solved inclusive politics and not by the bullets. Had they have embraced Garang’s roadmap for reforming Sudan (Masabo, 2013; Zambakari 2015), it could have helped to bind them together as people of South Sudan. And thirdly, they did not capture the real picture that what...
was happening was a clear sign that the problem was not only the North, but the specter of decolonization, poor governance, lack of development and the continued forces of imperialism that were feeding on the lucrative resources of the underdeveloped and South Sudan respectively.

To overcome all these some scholars (Owiso, 2018; Radon and Logan 2014) are calling South Sudanese to rebuild their country under the principles of modern statecraft, which put at the centre respect and promotion of human rights, democracy and democratic leadership. However, the question that such proposal leaves unanswered is how South Sudanese should go about it. This is so because it is not a new call and not a novel arrangement different from those that were anticipated the CPA almost fifteen years ago. Nevertheless, others too, have not been tired in responding to the how question. Scholars such as (Awolich, 2018; De Vries and Schomerus, 2017; Krause, 2019; Nyadera, 2018; Owiso, 2018; Zambakari, 2015) have responded to this question, and attempted to show how South Sudanese can go about in embracing human rights, democracy and democratic leadership. Two approaches from these scholars standout in providing implementable solutions to South Sudan. The first focus on the “the establishment of an inclusive framework to manage diverse populations within a unified nation” (Zambakari, 2015), and the second focuses on the establishment “transitional authority that will help deconstruct the myth that ethnicity is the basis of survival and instead suggests the establishment of a government” (Nyadera, 2018: 60-61). Although they are implementable proposals, they are nevertheless not easy ones, as they may seem since they touch the core issues that have characterised the politics that have been constraining peace and national building in South Sudan. They invite South Sudanese to shifting from their focus on ethnic groups and embrace the whole nation in organising their polity as one of the necessary pathways for greater good for all.

Within these proposals, leaders’ self-criticism and realisation that peace in South Sudan is beyond Dinka and Nuer, and that nation building strategies ought to move beyond Dinka-Nuer binary by providing strategic direction and vision that all South Sudanese can rally around regardless of their differences in ethnic origin. Once such acknowledgement and self-evaluation is made, Zambakari (2015:71) then challenges them that given their diversities in terms of languages and nationalities (ethnic groups), “they must build a more inclusive political community that upholds unity in diversity, maintains the rule of law, and practices democracy in governance.” If this is to be realised, many of the issues that have been haunting South Sudan will be solved amicably and peacefully. Nonetheless, going incidences after independence particularly those of 2013 and 2016 that claimed people’s lives and property, signs of respect human rights and
promotion of democracy and democratic leadership seem to have not roots in South Sudan. It is even frustrating when we the very independence that people have been fighting for long, becomes a reawakening moment for old conflicts, and exacerbating created new ones.

This have anticipated neither by the 2005 CPA negotiators nor by those coming to power cession referendum. Surprisingly even the newly military-political elite seem not to care about it and issues of national building under the template of modern statecraft receives only lip service. Its top priority has been to constitute itself as a military aristocracy through various predation strategies (some dating the days of war) that are keen to favour expansion of its own kinship network (Pinand, 2014: 193) without regarding other groups, all who are part of the nation. This is contra to the words from the July 2011 South Sudan Independence speech that President Salva Kiir made in which he affirmed the imperative of the government that is democratic, inclusive and accountable as a critical foundation for the future of the South Sudanese and as a guarantor for sustaining a sovereign nation (Gosztonyi, 2016: 180).

Other point of disagreement particularly between President Kiir and vice President Riek Machar that have led the spirit of South Sudan’s ruling party Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) into two: SPLM mainstream under President Kiir, and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement In Opposition (SPLM-IO) under Machar are their approaches on how South Sudan should be governed. Kiir favoured a more unitary reorganisation of South Sudan, which was to base and maintaining the former 10 existing states, while Machar favoured a federal system of government and wanted an increase in number of states from 10 to 21. Kiir opposed Machar’s approach anchoring that such proposed governance system would undermine national unity. However he later made a U-turn following the 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) by hijacking Machar’s federal government system proposal and increased the number of states not only from 10 to 21 states as previously Machar proposed, but from 10 to 28 states, and later to 32 states. This move has been interpreted by the SPLM-IO as a containment strategy of its Neur constituency (Aalen, 2019).

These and all other ill implementation of the CPA (Mamdani, 2017a; Masabo, 2013), new leaders lack of political will (De Vries and Schomerus, 2017), and identity and citizenship crisis in South Sudan (see next section) poses a stumbling block to Zambakari’s (2015) inclusive political community solution for South Sudan. It is here and from a more refined analysis Nyadera (2018) recommends going back to roots and address the root causes for war recurrence and failure of various peace deals. This is so because, “competition for political power and differing ideologies among
local leaders create a scenario where communities regroup within their ethnic cocoons in order to advance their cause” (Nyadera, 2018: 69). For peace to flourish, addressing all these is cannot be overemphasized.

To resolve with factors inhibiting progress in South Sudan and for ending conflict recurrence, like De Vries and Schomerus (2017) and Masabo (2013); Nyadera (2018) proposes moving beyond Dinka-Nuer binary because such framework framing of South Sudan conflicts and problems has been responsible for the many failures of the many peace agreement. This is so because most of the solutions made, have fallen victims of this framing and thus ignoring ethnic animosities and rivalries beyond those of Dinka and Nuer. Within the international community such framing have led to oversimplification of the conflict in South Sudan (De Vries and Schomerus, 2017) and as the result “the excessive attention given to the government and the opposition in the ongoing civil war has overshadowed genuine grievances that ordinary citizens of the country are facing and that can motivate them to take up arms and fight” (Nyadera (2018: 75). And because of this trend of war recurrences in South Sudan, Nyadera, (2018: 60) proposes the establishment of transitional authority as “an exit strategy that will ensure the gaps that allowed previous peace agreements to collapse are sealed by involving local, regional and international actors.” This is a powerful proposition though it also attracts a number of questions such, how novel is the proposal, and to what extent does it differ those proposed in the CPA and subsequent peace agreements such as the 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS)? It for these and many other unanswered questions this article proposes the embracing of human rights, democracy and democratic leadership as a tool to help in overcoming the existing tensions and for better organisation of the new South Sudan.

However, an observation have to be made, that, although external help and support is necessary for South Sudanese in this journey; it is only them who can only successfully bring about needed changes and transformation. In addition to what has been suggested, South Sudan’s the take-off point for peace need to consider self-reflection and self-criticism particularly asking themselves the extent to which they have benefited from last seven or so years of instability. It is high time to stop shelving history but also is not time to embark of history of warring ethnic groups. Nevertheless, as Zambakari (2015) have rightly argued; the way forward ought to be an embrace of unity in diversity. Diversity ought to be cerebrated but not as a means of identifications and national building. Since they have joined the East Africa community, they have good examples. Countries like Tanzania have many ethnic groups though not matching in number to those in South Sudan, and can provide learning lessons for them as they strive to embrace
values of modern states organization. South Sudanese need to remind themselves that, democracy as an element of modernity calls for good governance, respect of human rights, accountability, and democratic ascendancy to power. These echo President Kiir independence speech words and calls for revisiting their aspirations and work out their practical implementation. The SPLM /SPLM-IO leaders should not overlooked the people’s higher expectation of independence gained by the price of blood of those who died in wars, hunger, displacement, and all the ramifications the fifty years of wars. To move forward addressing their differences amicably and putting people first in all what is done be it the government, leaders or ordinary citizens do and by remembering that if they are to embrace the eight pillars of peace framework; there are possibilities of having a viable community determined to peaceful co-exist not only with itself but also with its neighbours.

**Nationality challenge: who is and who is not a South Sudanese?**

One of the major impacts of foreign domination in Africa was the introduction of categories of recognition (Lund 2016; Mamdani, 2017b; 2012). They set in motion the need for some of communities to constantly struggle for their recognition and access of resources as these newly introduced categories created became the major defining principles for citizenship, belongingness and provided means for access use of resources (Lund, 2016; Marko, 2016; 2015). Moreover, these new categories of recognition became among the many causes of the postcolonial wars in Africa that have consumed lives of many people and devastated property.

The people of the present South Sudan, are among those who have been fighting for recognition as the result of historical created categories and a country where struggle for recognition and access to resources continue to destroy property and devour lives of many people (Zambakari, 2015). Like it was to many Africa countries and people in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, July 2011 South Sudan’s independence most of the South Sudanese was expected to be the beginning of new end: the beginning of a new country where struggle for identities and access to resources could be left to shelved historical books. Their hoped was that, this hard won independence and newly created country could provide a single and common identity, by striking balance between history, cultural values, and modernity; what Makumba (2007: 110) calls, “African twin-desire: the desire on the one hand for cultural personalization and to the other hand for doing so in dialogue with modernisation.”

The crisis of citizenship in South Sudan is linked to the history of state formation in Sudan (Zambakari, 2015: 73). When the British decided to rule it and give it demarcation, the people continued to live under the different chiefdoms. It took colonialism to make what we call South Sudan today. In
that regard, the national identity of this new country is not automatic, but it has to be re-worked-on by inspiring people to regard themselves as one. Although some scholars tend to particularise the South Sudan case as a country whose “independence came about under unique circumstances that differed from those in African countries with fair social, economic and education infrastructures” (Nyadera, 2018: 80); with regard to the citizenship and identity question it is not unique. As Zambakari (2015: 76) points-out, there are similarities between identity and citizenship struggles by South Sudanese to those “struggles with the contested nature of citizenship and the dual system of native/settler that operate in most countries in East Africa.” It is an important struggle they should face as many African countries have faced it and some continue to face it.

Some have made significant successes such as Tanzania (Mamdani, 2012) but other on continuous reforms such as Rwanda (Mamdani, 2002). Nonetheless though is not unique, South Sudan is case which calls for devising “a new concept of citizenship that is inclusive of the different nationalities within the country as well as those who are coming from outside may wish to make South Sudan their homes” (Zambakari, 2015: 76). This is necessary if peace is to flourish and forging common identity is to be achieved. An understanding that identity formation and making people feel as South Sudanese citizens will not come by only identifying demarcations that divides them; but rather by twining the common history (colonialism and struggles for independence) with the common vision of enjoying the country’s resources together is necessary. This is a call to self-denial for the sake of South Sudan’s better future.

To make this possible the government has to provide for its people in order to make them feel the value of being citizens. People ought to go beyond the ethnic binary by embracing a countrywide identity ethic that recognizes everyone. South Sudanese and their leaders should know that violence will not smash the legacy of colonial created identities, but rather it requires a political vision and political organisation. The so-called South Sudanese identity will only depend on the legal and administrative apparatus in place. They should reckon Mamdani’s (2012: 107) advice in Define and Rule: Political as Identity, that envisages the “creation of a substantive law from a multiple sources—pre-colonial life, colonial modern form of state and anticolonial resistances (for South Sudan this should as well constitute anti-north resistances)—and establishment of a single and unified law-enforcing machinery meant for every citizen.” This is key to resolving their problems. More so, they should not undermine the fact that South Sudan is a multi-diversified society in terms of ethnicity, culture, and religion and that secession cannot be the answer to their diversity (Hawi, 2014: 41). That is to say, South Sudan does not belong to Dinka and Nuer only; and any clashes
between them should not translate into a country clash and slain lives of innocent citizens. Rather, they should find means to deliberate their conflicts amicably considering the interests of other ethnic groups. In addition, the major ethnic groups should not translate the vote value of secession referendum that gave birth to South Sudan into another form of domination. They need to understand the fact that, there will be no leader who will not belonging to either ethnic group and that, in itself should not be a problem, but only when it is misused and used as a point of discriminating others.

**Role of governance in the South Sudan’s challenge of national building**

Since 1980s and more particularly in 1990s, the term ‘governance’ and increasingly ‘good governance’ and ‘bad governance’ have permeated development discourse and especially research agendas and other activities funded by public and private banks and bilateral donors such as the United Nations (UN) and its agencies, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Weiss, 2000). Nonetheless, the term governance is not new and uncontested one. What are probably new and contested are the newly coined concepts of ‘good governance’ and ‘bad governance’, which are, disputed among scholars and policy experts. Based on Elahi’s (2009: 1167) account, the term, ‘good governance’ was first mentioned, causally, in the World Bank’s (1989) report: *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth – A Long-Term Perspective Study*, but the idea crystallized into the most popular international development policy project within a decade.

Governance can be defined as a concept as well as a process. As a concept, however it has no universal accepted definition, but rather varying definitions that tend to have an emphasis on some issues but almost depicting the same purposes. In public administration literature for example, it reflects a paradigm shift within the field. To public administration pundits, governance paradigm emerged in early 1990s. And as Henry (2007: 40) remarks, governance is the results of “1980s…trends that connote fundamental change in how we perceived the governments and its administration…under the rubrics of globalisation, redefinition and devolution and these developments are causing enormous change within and among the three sectors—public, private and non-profit.” Within this understanding, and as the way Hooghe, Liesbet and Marks (2009: 2) conceptualise it, governance has two entirely different purposes. First, it “is a means to achieve collective benefits by coordinating human activity.” Given the variety of public goods and their varying externalities, efficient governance will be multi-leveled. Second, governance is “an expression of community. Citizens care passionately about who exercises authority over them.” Within the UN, the World Bank and IMF literature, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) often binds them with term
governance to the 1997 most popular definition. In one of its 1997 policy
documents, *Governance for Sustainable Human Development*, the UNDP
defined governance as “the exercise of economic, political and
administrative authorities to manage a country’s affairs at all levels,
[comprising] mechanisms, processes and institutions, through which
citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet
their obligations and mediate their differences” (UNDP, 1997:1-2).

In this perspective, governance comprises the mechanisms, processes and
institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests,
exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their
differences (Braathen, Chaligha & Odd-Helge, 2005: 9). As such, “it entails a
more devolved system of governance as opposed to centralized one, which
opens door for common people to participate in the governing of their own
affairs and creating a sense of ownership” (Masabo, 2013: 144). It is in this
context that governance systems become an imperative aspect of South
Sudan national building as it can enhance participation and accountability
that forms amongst many other factors pointed out as the causes of the
continued wars in this new African republic.

Scholars writing on South Sudan conflicts especially those focusing on the
period after independence tend to peg governance as a litmus paper test for
the rebuilding of South Sudan. Radon and Logan (2014: 149) for example,
posit South Sudan as “a prime example of how governance arrangements
can either achieve and maintain peace or become the trigger for civil war.”
Based on this observation, deciding which framework best suit the
organisation of South Sudan polity is primary for its sustainability; an
imperative ordering framework that can accommodate challenges coming
from a country that “is sparsely populated and ethnically, culturally and
linguistically diverse” (Radon and Logan, 2014:152) such as South Sudan.

In that regard, adoption of a decentralised and federal system of governance
is not a choice but a must. This is so because “studies have indicated that
presidential systems are prone to ‘authoritarian collapse’ or ‘democratic
breakdowns’ than parliamentarianism (Radon and Logan, 2014:156) and the
experiences of South Sudan so far seem to affirm this view. The challenge,
like many proposals from other scholars is how this proposed framework
work-out and which template at had that South Sudanese could re-work on,
to work-on, adjust to their contexts, and implement to reverse what has
been going on since independence.

In response, Awolich (2018) dives-in and provides some suggestions on
how to go about embracing governance in South Sudan. In his policy brief
for Sudd Institute in Juba, which he titles ‘Fixing Governance is Key to
Stability in South Sudan’, he identifies major challenges facing the country and examine the extent to which the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) has put governance and mechanisms to realise it at its core. Persisting major challenges that Awolich (2018) finds are the lack of good governance strategic direction and vision at which all the people rally around in forging a national identity. Although the R-ARCSS seem to have missed the target, Awolich is still hopeful that, it has “set out mandates for the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGONU)” (Awolich, 2018:10).

The emphasis these authors make suggests the imperative and power of governance in re-organising the ethnic torn South Sudan. It is so because governance remains core for peace consolidation while at the same time is challenging, since establishing a functioning governance system in war torn country is not an easy task. To have it in place, government’s commitment to development and citizens’ patience are needed. As such, South Sudan reminded to avoid and not imitate the ill examples from other independent countries. While there are many African leaders who embraced repressive governance systems, as well as siphoning public resources by squandering the country’s wealth as individual properties, South Sudan’s leaders should avoid that.

They should be aware that, if they do so, it would take them back to war. Furthermore, the claim of poor functioning of the incumbent’s government and corruption complains (Awolich, 2018; Nyadera, 2018) should be worked-on seriously and addressed squarely if the government wants to prove its legitimacy. Adoption of decentralized governance is not only a bridge to successful nation building, but also a key to empowerment and participation. South Sudan should aim at being an exemplary state in Africa since it has a lot to learn from the experiences of other countries. It should adopt a mode of government that qualifies it as a newly twenty-first-century created state, as such self-awareness is important to this understanding.

Moreover, it is tacit that, the struggle for popular sovereignty is an ongoing process and thus South Sudan is not an exception. The popular uprising that rocked the North African region beginning with Tunisia and spreading to Egypt, Libya and now recently Omar Bashir government in Sudan, others is a testimony of how juridical freedom and civil-military relationship is being translated by ordinary people into popular freedom (Ndlovu-Gatshen, 2013: 32). Likewise, for South Sudan leaders they should know that the signal sent by the attempted coup should not be underestimated, but rather serve as an awakening moment to resolve all the pending questions of power in South Sudan.
Lastly, South Sudanese ought to be aware that something you cannot do for yourself, no one can do it for you. They should be confident and understand that, if they made it for territorial self-determination; they should not hesitate for political, cultural, and economic self-determination. To forge ahead, investment in both economic, political and administrative infrastructure and human resources is paramount. South Sudan should provide progressive and liberating education to its citizens to empower them to stand for the development of their country by avoiding producing westernized graduates who are alienated from South Sudan, African society and its African values.

Conclusion

Although South Sudan still faces many challenges, it still hold hope for making it a better place for the millions of population. The challenges that it faces particularly the historical one of state formation or what Lund (2016) calls ‘production of property and citizenship’ needs fresh answers. One of the ways to address and answer the many dilemmas highlighted within this article is by challenging what Marko (2015) call ‘ethnic turn’ which entails the return to the colonial categorization and classification of people according to ethnicity; which has become central to South Sudan citizenship production process. Given the many dynamics of state formation processes in the country, there is a need of addressing some key issues. Among those key issues are that the country is faced with is the formidable challenge of recognition and access to resources. Thus, addressing issues of recognition and national identity creation is one of the stepping-stones towards sustainable peace in South Sudan. The international community ought to continue offering help to South Sudan in demilitarization, especially by collecting the small arms that are easily available in country. Furthermore, working on what the AUCISS (2014) report proposed and the ongoing African Union initiatives to normalize the peaceful condition in the country, have to be worked out to re-awaken the hope of life in newly born and the youngest African country—Republic of South Sudan.

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