Structural and Political Barriers to Effective Enforcement at the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights

Abstract

The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (AfCHPR) was established in 2004 and commenced operations in 2006 with a mandate to interpret and apply the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other relevant human rights instruments. Nearly two decades later, persistent non-compliance with its judgments, the limited number of states granting direct individual access, and structural weaknesses in enforcement mechanisms continue to undermine its effectiveness. This article interrogates these challenges from the perspective of defence counsel practising before the Court, situating the analysis within the institutionalist theory of international law, which posits that strong, rule-bound institutions are necessary to ensure compliance. Drawing on case law—including Ogiek v. Kenya, Ally Rajabu v. Tanzania, and Konaté v. Burkina Faso—and recent implementation data, the article argues that the Court’s legitimacy and impact are contingent on both political will and institutional reform. It proposes a set of concrete reforms to enhance compliance, improve access, and strengthen the Court’s role in advancing human rights protection in Africa.